



8 October 2026

Public Contracts Review Board
Notre Dame Ditch
Floriana FRN1601
Malta

Dear Sirs,

Re: Tender for the Leasing of Fixed Radar Speed Meters and Data Processing Applications at Various Sites in Malta for the Local Enforcement Systems Agency (LESA) – Reference CT2047/2026 (the “Tender”)

1. We have been instructed by Securital Solutions Limited (TID 243655) (the **Appellant**) to lodge an application in terms of Regulation 270 of the Public Procurement Regulations (**PPR**).
2. The Appellant is aggrieved by the decision of the Department of Contracts and the Local Enforcement Systems Agency (the **Contracting Authority**) of 29 September 2026 to reject the Appellant's bid and to award the Tender to ENGINE SPA (TID 243652) (the **Recommended Tenderer**). The Appellant was notified of the Contracting Authority's decision by means of a letter dated 29 September 2026 (the **Letter of Rejection**).¹
3. The Appellant is aggrieved by the Contracting Authority's decision for the following reasons:
 - a. FIRST GROUND OF APPEAL: THE CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE REQUESTED INFORMATION
 - b. SECOND GROUND OF APPEAL: THE RECOMMENDED TENDERER'S FINANCIAL OFFER APPEARS TO BE ABNORMALLY LOW
4. Before delving into the grounds of objection, the Appellant sets out the events leading up to the Contracting Authority's decision and this objection.

¹ Exhibit A-1, Letter of Rejection dated 29 September 2026.

A. FACTS

5. The Appellant is one of Malta's leading integrated security companies. Its roots date back to 1988 and it was a former G4S Malta operation. The company rebranded from G4S Malta to Securital Solutions following the acquisition of the remaining equity by KDM Group in December 2024, whilst retaining the same leadership, employees, registrations and operational structure. The Appellant employs over 1,700 professionals and serves more than 300 organisations across multiple sectors in Malta.
6. The Appellant is the incumbent contractor under the Framework Agreement for the Provision of Security Services at the Local Enforcement System Agency (SPD2/2021/050).
7. The Contracting Authority issued the Tender for the leasing of fixed radar speed meters and data processing applications at various sites in Malta for LESA. The Tender was not divided into lots and contemplated a five-year contract, with the possibility of two further extensions of two years each.
8. The estimated procurement value was €2,400,000. This was based on market research.
9. On 28 May 2026, three economic operators, including the Recommended Tenderer and the Appellant, submitted tenders. Some of them, including the Appellant, submitted more than one tender.
10. On 29 September 2026, the Contracting Authority recommended that the Tender be awarded to the Recommended Tenderer for the price of €1,131,000.
11. By means of the Letter of Rejection, the Contracting Authority informed the Appellant that its two tenders were not the most economically advantageous and that the Tender had been recommended for award to the Recommended Tenderer.
12. On 6 October 2026, the Appellant, through its legal counsel, requested disclosure of information concerning the procurement process, the Recommended Tenderer and its bid, the Appellant's bids, and any request for and assessment of explanations concerning the Recommended Tenderer's apparently abnormally low financial offer (the **Request for Information**).
13. The Appellant requested disclosure by 17:30 hrs on 7 October 2026, in view of the appeal deadline of 9 October 2026, and reserved its rights in the event that the requested information was not provided.

14. To date, the Contracting Authority has neither provided that information nor acknowledged receipt of the Request for Information.

B. FIRST GROUND OF APPEAL: THE CONTRACTING AUTHORITY FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE REQUESTED INFORMATION

15. The Contracting Authority has not replied to the Appellant's Request for Information,² which sought information on the Recommended Tenderer and its bid, on the evaluation process and on the examination, if any, of the Recommended Tenderer's apparently abnormally low financial offer (the **Requested Information**).
16. None of the Requested Information is confidential. Under Regulation 40(2) of the PPR,³ the "*names of subcontractors*", "*the documentation submitted by economic operators attesting that they comply with selection criteria*" and "*technical information which is already made available in public*" shall not be considered as confidential. Moreover, a tenderer's experience and the references relied upon to demonstrate it cannot be classified as confidential in their entirety, and the essential content of non-name-specific information on key experts and subcontracting must, in any event, be accessible to all tenderers.⁴
17. The Requested Information is not commercially sensitive, nor does it constitute a trade secret the disclosure of which may prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of the Recommended Tenderer. In any case, where an item might contain confidential information, the Appellant expressly invited the Contracting Authority to disclose it in a neutral or redacted form or, as regards any explanations given by the Recommended Tenderer on its abnormally low offer, to communicate their essential content in summary form.⁵
18. The Requested Information is essential for the Appellant to substantiate its second ground of appeal and to determine whether to raise additional grievances against the decision to award the public contract to the Recommended Tenderer.
19. In the absence of the Requested Information, which would enable it to ascertain whether the Contracting Authority's decision is vitiated by errors or unlawfulness, the Appellant cannot exercise its right to an effective review under the Remedies Directive (Council Directive 89/665/EEC, as amended).

² Exhibit A-2, Request for Information dated 6 October 2026, including Annex A.

³ These legal provisions are drawn from and implement Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (the "Classical Directive").

⁴ C-54/21 *Antea Polska and Others* (17 November 2022) para. 73, 74 and 80.

⁵ *ibid* 4, para. 66 and 67.

20. The Appellant must, in the interests of transparency and to ensure compliance with the requirements of good administration and effective judicial protection, enjoy access, at the very least, to the essential content of the Requested Information.
21. Without the Requested Information, the Appellant is effectively being deprived of its right to lodge a substantive objection against the Contracting Authority's decision of 29 September 2026 in terms of Regulation 270 of the PPR.
22. Therefore, apart from requesting this Honourable Board to order the Contracting Authority to disclose the Requested Information, the Appellant is hereby fully reserving its right to file a fresh objection, and to supplement its second ground of appeal, in light of such disclosure.

C. SECOND GROUND OF APPEAL: THE RECOMMENDED TENDERER'S FINANCIAL OFFER APPEARS TO BE ABNORMALLY LOW

23. The Appellant submits that the Recommended Tenderer's financial offer appears to be abnormally low and that, therefore, the Contracting Authority should have triggered an investigation in terms of Regulation 243 of the PPR.
24. Even if the Contracting Authority did investigate the Recommended Tenderer's financial offer, the Appellant submits that it should have rejected that offer.

(i) The Contracting Authority was duty bound to request an explanation of the abnormally low financial offer

25. If a financial offer *appears* to be abnormally low, a contracting authority is statutorily bound to request an explanation from the tenderer concerned.
26. Regulation 243(1) of the PPR, which is modelled on Article 69 of the Classical Directive, imposes an obligation on the Contracting Authority to request explanations from a tenderer whose financial offer appears to be abnormally low:

"Contracting authorities shall require economic operators to explain the price or costs proposed in the tender where tenders appear to be abnormally low in relation to the works, supplies or services."

27. According to established jurisprudence of the Malta Court of Appeal, a financial offer *appears* to be abnormally low if it is at least 12% lower than the estimated procurement value.⁶
28. In *X Clean*,⁷ *Medbiologix*,⁸ and *WM Environmental*,⁹ the Court of Appeal explained that it is most logical to compare the financial offer with the estimated procurement value because the latter should be deemed realistic, given that it should be based on market research.
29. In this case, the Recommended Tenderer has submitted a financial offer which is approximately 53% lower than the estimated procurement value of the Tender.¹⁰
30. At face value, the Contracting Authority was duty bound to request an explanation from the Recommended Tenderer on its financial offer in terms of Regulation 243(1) of the PPR.
31. If the Contracting Authority issued no such request for explanation, then this Honourable Board can stop here. It can quash the Contracting Authority's decision of 29 September 2026 and order a re-evaluation of the bids submitted.

(ii) The Contracting Authority must have verified the abnormally low offer

32. On receipt of explanations on an apparently abnormally low financial offer, a contracting authority must assess the merits of the information provided, and then decide whether to admit or reject that tender.¹¹ The contracting authority's assessment and decision should be documented.
33. The contracting authority's assessment must lead to a determination as to whether that tender is "sufficiently genuine".¹² The contracting authority may accept that financial offer if it is deemed "realistic and doable" and if there is no good reason to reject that financial offer.¹³

⁶ Court of Appeal, *Star Fuels Limited vs WasteServ Malta Limited et* delivered on 22 January 2024, as cited in *Medbiologix*, para. 60.

⁷ Court of Appeal, *X Clean Limited vs Dipartiment għall-Anzjanità Attiva u Kura fil-Komunità et* delivered on 21 August 2021.

⁸ Court of Appeal, *Medbiologix Company Limited vs Enemalta plc et* delivered on 14 March 2024, paras 58 and 59.

⁹ Court of Appeal, *WM Environmental Limited vs Dipartiment tal-Kuntratti et* delivered on 29 January 2026, para 40.

¹⁰ The Tender's estimated procurement value is €2,400,000, while the Recommended Tenderer has submitted a financial offer of €1,131,000.

¹¹ C-669/20 *Veridos GmbH* (15 September 2022) para 36.

¹² *ibid* 11, para 38.

¹³ Court of Appeal, *Cardona Engineering Works vs Central Procurement & Supplies Unit* delivered on 17 June 2024, para 31.

34. If, on the other hand, the “*evidence supplied does not satisfactorily account for the low level of price or costs proposed*”, then the contracting authority may reject that financial offer.¹⁴
35. Further, the Financial Bid Form attached to the Tender made it clear that: “*Tenderers are reminded that the Contracting Authority is entitled to reject any offer which is considered to be abnormally low according to Regulation 243 of S.L. 601.03*”.
36. At this stage, the Appellant does not know whether the Contracting Authority complied with its obligation under Regulation 243 of the PPR and whether it assessed the explanations provided, since the Contracting Authority has given no reasons on this point (see sub-section (iii) below). In this respect, the Appellant reserves all rights.

(iii) The Contracting Authority failed to state reasons for accepting the Recommended Tenderer's financial offer

37. In this case, the Recommended Tenderer's financial offer is approximately 53% lower than the estimated procurement value. By means of the Request for Information, the Appellant expressly asked for any request for explanations sent to the Recommended Tenderer under Regulation 243 of the PPR, the explanations received and the evaluation committee's assessment of them.¹⁵
38. In *Sopra Steria*,¹⁶ the Court of Justice confirmed that, where an unsuccessful tenderer expressly asks why the successful tender was not considered to be abnormally low, the contracting authority must give it those reasons. Where that request is made in writing and is reasoned, the contracting authority must carry out a detailed analysis of the successful tender and inform the tenderer of the broad outlines of that analysis.
39. It cannot merely state, without any justification, that the tender is not abnormally low, as this would deprive the tenderer of its right to an effective remedy under Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
40. These principles apply equally here. Article 55(2)(c) of the Public Procurement Directive likewise entitles any tenderer that has made an admissible tender to be informed of “*the characteristics and relative advantages of the tender selected*”, and Article 47 of the Charter applies whenever EU procurement law is implemented.

¹⁴ PPR, Regulation 243(4).

¹⁵ Exhibit A-2, Annex A, Items 10 to 12.

¹⁶ C-101/22 P *Commission v Sopra Steria Benelux and Unisys Belgium* (11 May 2023) paras 51, 80, 82 and 83.

41. This is all the more so in this case, for two reasons. First, the price criterion was decisive in the ranking of the tenders, and price was the only relative advantage of the Recommended Tenderer's tender. Second, the Appellant's experience as the incumbent contractor should have led the Contracting Authority to lend credence to its concerns as to whether the contract can be performed at that price.¹⁷
42. Given that the Recommended Tenderer's price is approximately 53% lower than the estimated procurement value, those reasons had to explain how the Contracting Authority concluded, first, that the tender complies with the applicable rules on the remuneration of staff, social security contributions and occupational health and safety and, second, that the price covers all the costs arising from the technical aspects of the tender.¹⁸
43. The Contracting Authority has given no reasons at all on this point, and has not replied to the Request for Information. Its decision is therefore vitiated by a failure to state reasons and should be quashed on that ground alone.

(iv) In any case, the Recommended Tenderer's financial offer should not have been accepted

44. Even if the Recommended Tenderer submitted an explanation, and even if the Contracting Authority assessed and documented its decision to accept its financial offer, the Recommended Tenderer's financial offer should have been rejected.
45. Based on the Appellant's understanding of the Tender, the successful tenderer will have to bear the following costs in performing the contract:
- a. The cost of the equipment (including spare units), its maintenance and repair, and its removal at the end of the contract.
 - b. The cost of software licensing.¹⁹
 - c. Server-related costs, including on-site hardware at LESA, redundancy, software, implementation and monitoring, shared storage, network switches and uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
 - d. The costs of independent calibration and commissioning.²⁰
 - e. The costs of registration with MCCA.²¹

¹⁷ *ibid* 16, para 84.

¹⁸ *ibid* 16, para 74.

¹⁹ Tender Dossier, page 18, Special Conditions, Clause 16.6.

²⁰ Tender Dossier, page 31, Terms of Reference, Clause 59.

²¹ Tender Dossier, page 31, Terms of Reference, Clause 59.

- f. The costs of a local agent in Malta to provide timely servicing and repair facilities.²²
 - g. The costs of training.²³
 - h. Labour costs, including helpdesk availability with 24/7 support, fast response times for tickets and remote diagnostics.²⁴
 - i. The performance guarantee of approximately €130,000 for the duration of the contract.²⁵
 - j. Insurance cover for all items.²⁶
 - k. Significant penalties in case of default, including €500 per day, increasing to €1,000 per day after 10 days.²⁷
46. According to the Appellant's best estimates, the costs associated with the performance of the contract resulting from the Tender significantly exceed the financial offer submitted by the Recommended Tenderer.
47. On this basis, the Appellant submits that the Recommended Tenderer is unlikely to generate a positive margin from the performance of the contract, and that it is unrealistic to expect the contract to be performed at that price in full compliance with the contractual and labour obligations.
48. For these reasons, the Contracting Authority should have rejected the Recommended Tenderer's financial offer.
49. In view of the foregoing, the Contracting Authority's decision of 29 September 2026 to recommend the award of the Tender to the Recommended Tenderer was wrong and should therefore be quashed.

D. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS

50. Although the Contracting Authority has disclosed the identity of the Recommended Tenderer and the model of the solution it proposed, the Appellant could not verify the Recommended Tenderer's compliance with the Tender conditions, as it was not able to find any relevant information in the public domain. On this basis, the Appellant reserves all rights in this regard with respect to any new information that might come to light during the hearing.

²² Tender Dossier, page 33, Terms of Reference, Clause 75.

²³ Tender Dossier, page 33, Terms of Reference, Clause 76.

²⁴ Tender Dossier, page 19, Special Conditions, Clause 19.2.

²⁵ Tender Dossier, page 17, Special Conditions, Clause 17.2.

²⁶ Tender Dossier, page 18, Special Conditions, Clause 13.2.

²⁷ Tender Dossier, page 19, Special Conditions, Clause 19.2.



THEREFORE, in view of the above and for any other reasons that may be brought in due course at law, the Appellant requests that this Public Contracts Review Board:

- a. order the Contracting Authority to disclose the information requested in the Appellant's Request for Information dated 6 October 2026;
- b. declare that the Contracting Authority's decision of 29 September 2026 is wrong and/or unlawful;
- c. consequently, quash and/or revoke the Contracting Authority's decision of 29 September 2026;
- d. order the refund of the deposit paid by the Appellant.

Yours sincerely,
Ganado Advocates

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "CMB", written over a faint circular stamp.

Dr. Clement Mifsud-Bonnici
(cmifsudb@ganado.com)

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "CC", written over a faint circular stamp.

Dr. Calvin Calleja
(ccalleja@ganado.com)



Your instructions have been processed successfully.

Transaction: Pay third party

Payee type: Personal Payee

Is the payee a joint
beneficiary: No

Payee name: Cashier

Payee surname: Malta Government

Relation: Administrative Services

Reason: Other

Payment details: PCRB re Speed Cameras

Currency: EUR - Euro

Beneficiary IBAN/Account: MT55MALT011000040001EURCMG5001H

Beneficiary IBAN/Account
type: Valid IBAN of country - Malta

Bank name: Other bank

Bank address / Bank's BIC: Let the bank apply the beneficiary bank BIC

Beneficiary address: No

Withdraw from account: G4S SEC SER (MLT (EUR) 1490629801 2

Charges should be paid by: Shared - I pay BOV charges; Cashier Malta Government pays the benefici
charges

Amount: EUR 12,000.00

Receiving bank to get the
money as: normal priority payment

FPAD Result: We couldn't confirm that the name you entered matches the recipient's ac
might happen if the recipient's bank doesn't support name checks yet or i
temporary issue. Please double-check that the name and account details
before continuing. If any details are wrong, the payment could go to the w
account or may be fraudulent and may not be recoverable. If you're confic
everything is correct, you can go ahead and make the payment.

To be effected on: as soon as possible

Credited amount: EUR 12,000.00

Debited amount (excluding
charges): EUR 12,000.00

Estimated amount to be
withdrawn from account: EUR 12,004.00

Transaction charge: EUR 4.00

Creator: Mr. Liam Lagana

Authorised by: Mr. Edward Chetcuti, Mr. Elton Debattista




List of Exhibits

Exhibit A-1

Letter of Rejection dated 29 September 2026

Exhibit A-2

Request for Information dated 6 October 2026, including Annex A



29th September 2026

EO Name: Securital Solutions Limited

TID 243655

REFERENCE: CT 2047/2026


SUBJECT: TENDER FOR THE LEASING OF FIXED RADAR SPEED METERS AND DATA PROCESSING APPLICATIONS AT VARIOUS SITES IN MALTA FOR THE LOCAL ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS AGENCY (LESA)

Thank you for participating in the above-mentioned tender procedure.

However, we regret to inform you that the offer submitted by your company has ranked **third**, as shown in the table below:

Tender ID	Name of Tenderer	Average Technical Score	Technical Score in proportion to offer with highest average technical score 70%	Financial Offer €	Financial Score in proportion to offer with lowest financial offer 30%	Overall Score (b) + (d)	Ranking
		a	b	c	d		
243652	ENGINE SPA	100.00	70.00	€1,131,000.00	30.00	100.00	1
243655	Securital Solutions Limited	100.00	70.00	€2,312,490.00	14.67	84.67	3

DIPARTIMENT TAL-KUNTRATTI
Notre Dame Ravelin
Floriana FRN 1601 – MALTA



DEPARTMENT OF CONTRACTS
Notre Dame Ravelin
Floriana FRN 1601 – MALTA
Contact Number: +356 2378 1001
e-Mail: info.contracts@gov.mt
website: www.contracts.gov.mt

The tender is recommended to:

TID 243652 ENGINE SPA for €1,131,000.00 excluding VAT, this being the offer with the Best Price Quality Ratio (BPQR). Tendered offers were evaluated as specified in the Section 1, Clause Number 6 'Criteria of the Award' of the Published Tender Document.


If you intend to object to this decision, the Public Procurement Regulations allow for an official objection which in this case has to be lodged at the Public Contracts Review Board, Notre Dame Ditch, Floriana by noon of Friday 9th October 2026 against the following a deposit of €12,000.00 of the tender estimate.

The official schedule can be accessed on the website: www.etenders.gov.mt


Although we have not been able to make use of your services on this occasion, I trust that you will continue to take an active interest in our initiatives.

Regards,


Wendell Mifsud
f/Director General (Contracts)



Tender ID Tenderer's Name	243655 Securital Solutions Limited		
	Maximum	Average Technical Score	Justification
Evaluation Criteria			
1.0 Reference Section 3, Clauses 1 – 7: Radar Technology	12	12	The Tenderer's proposed Sensys Gatso T-Series Fixed solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 1–7. The submitted Technical Compliance Statement expressly confirms full compliance with all requirements under Clauses 1–7. The documentation confirms that the proposed system uses non-intrusive radar-based detection, with no intervention or sensors beneath the road surface. The radar operates in the 24 GHz ISM band and is specified for licence-free operation. The RT4.1 radar continuously measures vehicle speed, direction and position, while the T-Series system box integrates the radar, camera and flash components within the self-contained enforcement system. The radar documentation further confirms that the system is benign with respect to health, stating that the radar does not pose a serious threat or adverse effects to persons in the vicinity
1. Uses a radar medium to sense the presence and speed of a road vehicle that does not impinge upon the structure of the road surface. There must be no sub-surface sensors			
2. The radar must be capable of being radiated without the need for a licence to transmit in the state of Malta			
3. The radar must be benign and pose no hazard to health			
4. The device must make the detection, measurement and recording of road vehicles in its immediate vicinity and be a single self-contained unit			
5. A facility for Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) that can be securely enabled and disabled as required by the operator of the system is required			
6. All outstations must be managed from a central control system that is located at the LESA office, preferably through the operator viewing system			



7.No part of the speedmeter, its mounting and illumination apparatus must overhang or impinge upon the part of the highway on which vehicles are normally driven.			and that its average output power is only a few milliwatts. The proposed solution also incorporates ANPR functionality, which can be enabled through the system's enforcement settings, with the system capturing images of detected vehicles and reading the corresponding registration plates. For central management, the submission provides for the VELOS PLUS central hub, which receives violation data from roadside enforcement systems and provides centralised site monitoring. The Site Status dashboard provides real-time monitoring of connected sites and records the latest data received from each site. The T-Series Fixed is designed for installation at the side of the road, with the system and auxiliary boxes housed within a pole-mounted cabinet. The installation and alignment documentation confirms positioning of the system alongside the road and configuration in relation to the road edge and enforced lanes. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 1–7 are considered Compliant.
2.0 Speed Detection, Reference Section 3, 8-10, 25-26 8 a. The Device must be capable of detecting a road vehicle, measuring its speed, making a permanent unalterable visual record that includes the relevant data to evidence an offence 8 b. The Device must make a second contemporaneous and independent measurement of speed to verify the primary method	12	12	The Tenderer's proposed Sensys Gatso T-Series Fixed solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 8–10 and 25–26. The Tenderer expressly confirms full compliance with the specified speed detection requirements. The submitted documentation demonstrates that the system detects and measures vehicle speed using the RT4.x radar and




8 c. Verification of the speed made by the secondary method, at 7b above, must be achieved by the use of a photographic method where one or 2 images are used to estimate the average speed between 2 times or 2 images. This is the preferred second method			produces evidential records. The radar continuously measures the speed, direction and position of vehicles, while speed violations generate high-resolution still images and video evidence. The system also supports a second, independent speed verification using a time or distance interval between photographic images.
8 d. When a photographic second check is used there must be no visual markings applied to the road surface			The photographic secondary verification is achieved by capturing an additional image after a predefined distance or time interval and comparing the calculated speed with the radar-measured speed. The submitted compliance statement further confirms that the system provides a second image at a fixed distance for this purpose.
8 e. Photographic images that show the vehicle subject to the measurement			The system supports multi-lane speed enforcement , with the documentation confirming operation for up to six lanes, exceeding the four-lane requirement. Lane configuration allows the number of lanes and enforcement direction to be defined, including approaching, receding, or both directions simultaneously .
8 f. The record is to be allocated with a unique identification number at the point of detection			The submitted verification documentation also confirms speed measurement accuracy in accordance with the stated specifications, with the speed measurement specification referenced to OIML R91 and the secondary verification method providing a calculated speed for comparison with the radar measurement.
9. The distance at which the requirements at 5 ANPR, above are realised, is not defined			Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 8–10 and 25–26 are considered Compliant.
10. The system must be capable of covering 4 lanes of traffic where the configuration will be required to:			
a. Detect vehicle speeds and create violation data for vehicles exceeding the speed threshold in any number of lanes up to its maximum number of lanes			
b. Detect vehicle speeds and create violation data for vehicles exceeding the speed threshold where vehicles are receding, approaching and receding & approaching the speedometer simultaneously			
c. The number of lanes and the direction of traffic will be configurable by the client operator			




3.0 Still Image Quality, Reference Section 3, Clauses 11–12			
11. The camera must have a digital camera system that can produce a still image or images. This may be achieved by use of a still image camera or by the selection of frames or fields from a non-interlaced progressive scan video camera system			The Tenderer's proposed Sensys Gatso T-Series Fixed solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 11–12. The Tenderer expressly confirms that the proposed solution is fully compliant with all the specified still image quality requirements.
12 a. The image quality must be capable of: Capturing an image of the whole vehicle subject to the speed measurement			The submitted documentation demonstrates that the GT20 camera is a high-resolution 20-megapixel CMOS camera capable of full-resolution still image capture at 30 fps, together with high-resolution video. The documentation further confirms that the system can capture multiple violations occurring simultaneously, including where vehicles are travelling closely together.
12 b. The image quality must be capable of: Showing the surrounding area at the scene to give context to the scene at which the violation has occurred			The evidence documentation demonstrates that violation images provide the whole scene and relevant vehicle information, while the violation marker identifies the vehicle subject to the violation. The system also provides ANPR functionality and an adjustable ANPR Region of Interest to support registration mark recognition.
12 c. Identifying the vehicle subject to the measurement when one or more vehicles appear within the image	12	12	The still-image evidence includes relevant event, measurement, enforcement and location information, including date, time, lane, measured speed, direction, vehicle type and other evidential data. The sample evidential images submitted on pages 114–119 further demonstrate contextual scene information, vehicle identification and evidential data displayed with the images.
12 d. Showing the registration mark of the vehicle in a way that can be interpreted by automatic optical character recognition (OCR) in the viewing system for the device			The submission also confirms infrared imaging and illumination, including an IR LED flash panel for illumination of
12 e. Identifying the registration mark, regulated by the relevant Malta law for the display of registration marks between the minimum and maximum distances at which the system can detect speeding vehicles, this includes the OCR system			
12 f. Being temporarily enhanced by the adjustment of the image parameters, brightness, contrast and gamma, so vehicle and registration mark identity can be readily interpreted in the images exported to the final violation record			
12 g. To aid clarity in hours of darkness the camera may switch to operate in the Infra-Red spectrum to produce greyscale images			



12 h. For operations in the hours of darkness the camera must be aided by an illuminating device that operates outside of the light spectrum that is visible to the human eye. It is preferable that the illuminating device is collocated with the vehicle detector and camera			still images, together with multi-spectral imaging and image optimisation capabilities.
12 i. The overall requirement for the images produced by the camera is that the make and model and registration mark of the vehicle is discernible in the images produced by the camera and to display the circumstance of the scene at which the event occurred			For timestamping, the Tenderer confirms that the system supports precise timestamping and system time synchronisation, with the compliance statement specifically confirming time synchronisation through GPS or NTP.
12 j. The date and time for the incident shown on each violation record must be within ± 10 seconds of the local time as defined by a broadcast radio clock			Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 11–12 are considered Compliant.
4.0 Video Capability, Reference Section 3, Clauses 13–16			
13. The speedmeter shall have the capability to make, store and recover moving video records of violation records			The Tenderer's proposed Sensys Gatso T-Series Fixed solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 13–16. The Tenderer expressly confirms that the proposed solution is fully compliant with all requirements under the Video Quality – Video Capability criteria.
14. For video records the image quality must be capable of: a. Capturing an image of the whole vehicle subject to the speed measurement			
14 b. Showing the surrounding area at the scene to give context to the scene at which the violation has occurred			The submitted documentation confirms that, in the case of a speed violation, the system provides a high-resolution still image and a video by default. The video can be recorded and included in each evidence file, with the video duration adjustable to capture footage before and after the event. The system is capable of speed enforcement across up to six lanes and can be configured for approaching, receding or both directions.
14 c. Identifying the vehicle subject to the measurement when one or more vehicles appear within the image	12	12	
14 d. Being temporarily enhanced by the adjustment of the image parameters so vehicle make, and model can be readily interpreted when compared to the images that are produced by the still image camera or cameras			
14 e. To aid clarity in hours of darkness the camera may switch to operate in the Infra-Red spectrum to produce monochrome/greyscale images			The T-Series GT20 camera captures images and event videos under all ambient light conditions, while the system includes an internal SSD for




14 f. The camera may be aided by an illuminating device that operates outside of the light spectrum that is visible to the human eye. It is preferable that the illuminating device is collocated with the vehicle detector and camera			storing evidence files and video archives.
14 g. The overall requirement for the images produced by the camera is that the make and model of the vehicle is discernible in the images produced by the camera when they are used in conjunction with the images from the still image camera or cameras			The documentation further demonstrates that the video evidence identifies the relevant vehicle and provides contextual information. The video data bar includes the event number, lane, date, time, evidence type and speed, while concurrent violations can be displayed and the highlighted line identifies the vehicle passing the trigger line.
14 h. The date and time for the incident shown on each violation record must be within ± 10 seconds of the local time as defined by a broadcast radio clock			The system also provides image-quality adjustment functionality, including adjustment of image brightness and flash power, together with configurable video resolution, frame rate and bitrate. The T-Series incorporates an IR LED flash panel for illumination of still images and optional video frames, supporting operation in hours of darkness. The submitted documentation confirms that the violation evidence package can include the video together with the still images and associated XML data. The system also provides a live video stream, with configurable live-stream quality up to 1280 × 960 pixels, supporting the required live view functionality at the central control application. For timestamping, the Tenderer confirms time synchronisation using GPS or NTP, and the compliance statement expressly confirms compliance with the required ± 10-second timestamp requirement. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 13–16 are considered Compliant.




5.0 Environmental Conditions, Reference Section 3, Clauses 17–21	12	12	The Tenderer's proposed Sensys Gatso T-Series Fixed solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 17–21. The Tenderer expressly confirms that the proposed solution is fully compliant with the Environmental Conditions requirements. The submitted documentation confirms that the T-Series systembox has been tested and complies with IP65 protection requirements in accordance with IEC 60529/EN 60529, thereby meeting the minimum IP55 requirement. For environmental operating conditions, the Tenderer specifies an operating temperature range of -25°C to +65°C, which is suitable for the local environment in Malta. The submission further confirms that the equipment incorporates
17. The speedmeter must be protected from dust and water ingress to IP55. IP65, IP56 and IP 66 are also acceptable			
18. The equipment shall function within specification over a temperature range that is suitable for the local environment in Malta			
19. The equipment must have a temperature sensor that will prevent the equipment from operating when the sensor detects a temperature that is beyond the working temperature range of the device			
20. The equipment must be manufactured from or be covered with a material that is resistant to UV radiation that prevents the degradation of the colour of the speedmeter housing for a minimum of 5 years			



21. The equipment will be required to operate in conditions that are close to the sea so must be suitably protected from corrosion in such conditions			the required temperature protection, with the environmental compliance documentation addressing operation outside the specified working temperature range. The Tenderer has also provided environmental testing documentation, including EMC, immunity, EMF and radio equipment testing. In relation to UV resistance, the cabinet is specified as powder coated, with the material stated to comply with AAMA 2605, providing durability of up to 10 years in severe conditions, thereby exceeding the minimum five-year requirement. For corrosion protection, the Tenderer specifies the use of stainless steel and powder coating. The supporting coating documentation also demonstrates resistance to environmental exposure, including an acetic salt spray test and humidity chamber testing. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 17–21 are considered Compliant.
6.0 Safety and Security, Reference Section 3, Clauses 37, 40–41 37. A tamper detection facility must be provided that on the occasion of unauthorised access, any violation data is erased from the camera memory 40. All data and control messaging exchanged between the roadside unit and the central system must be encrypted using secure protocols. Encryption must meet or exceed AES-192 standards or equivalent (e.g., AES-256, ChaCha20). The system must support TLS 1.3, HTTPS, SSH, IPsec, and VPN tunneling. Encryption keys must be stored securely and rotated periodically in accordance with ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST SP 800-57 guidelines.	10	10	The Tenderer's proposed Sensys Gatso T-Series Fixed solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 40–41. The submitted Safety/Security Measures Description and Cybersecurity Architecture Statement provide documentation addressing encryption, cryptographic protection, tamper detection, data integrity, key protection, auditability and information security. The submitted T-Series Data Security documentation confirms that the system uses cryptographic functions to ensure the integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of evidence data.



41. All cryptographic keys used for communications and violation data must be configurable by LESA at the OVDS (Offender Violation Data System). The system must include tamper detection mechanisms that automatically revoke or delete keys upon detection of unauthorized physical or logical access. Key management must support audit logging, role-based access control, and integration with LESA's centralized key vault infrastructure.		Violation files are encrypted using AES-256, while RSA-2048 is used for protection of the symmetric encryption key. The documentation also confirms that cryptographic keys are securely managed and protected within the camera, with the private signing key retained within the device. The submission further demonstrates that the system incorporates tamper detection and response mechanisms. In particular, the secure storage device protects critical security parameters and destroys the signing key if the camera housing is opened. The separate Tamper Detection & Data Integrity Assurance Framework provides for physical security controls, hardware and software integrity monitoring, secure firmware verification, digital signatures, automated self-testing, audit trails and immediate transition to a secure state following detection of an anomaly. The documentation also provides for audit logging and traceability of user interactions, system events and evidence lifecycle operations. In addition, the Tenderer has submitted a valid ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certification, covering activities and services relating to the provision of traffic enforcement solutions. The certificate is valid from 10 July 2025 until 1 May 2028, with Sensys Gatso Netherlands B.V. included within the certified scope. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 40–41 are considered Compliant.
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
7.0 OVDS and Integration, Reference Section 3, (Clauses 42–57)			The Tenderer's proposed Sensys Gatso T-Series Fixed / VELOS PLUS solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 42–57. The Tenderer has submitted a Technical Compliance Statement expressly confirming full compliance with the requirements under the Functional Requirements – OVDS Integration Reference.
42. The Offence Viewing and Decision System (OVDS) is to be capable of the export of data that is compatible with the LES (Local Enforcement System) application as defined in "LES - Speed Camera Integration API Documentation"			
43. The violation record and associated data must be exported to the LES driver enquiry database after adjudication by the LESA operator			
44. The speedometer is to be capable of reading the registration plate of vehicles subject to a speeding violation and appending the registration number to a data field for that purpose			The submitted documentation demonstrates that the proposed VELOS PLUS platform provides an open and extensible API framework, standardised XML-coded exports and secure data-transfer functionality for integration with external systems. The LESA integration methodology provides for transformation of violation data, metadata tagging and secure transfer to the receiving system.
45. The registration number produced at 44, above, will be presented in the OVDS to the verifier of each violation record and be capable of alteration by the viewer to correct any registration number that is misrepresented by the ANPR function	12	12	
46. The system is to have an auxiliary output that can function as an ANPR facility that forms a configurable real-time Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system and that feature be capable of a configuration that allows the control of the enabling & disabling of the feature with connectivity possible to a separate security system			The T-Series Fixed also provides ANPR streaming functionality, which can be enabled or disabled, while the submitted documentation identifies functionality for blacklist/passages monitoring and integration with external systems.
47. The real-time ANPR function will be capable of having a list so that alarms can be raised at the administration center, this may be enabled by either a central database containing the list or the list may be uploaded from the administration center to any or all of the roadside cameras			The VELOS PLUS platform provides centralised site monitoring, real-time operational status, alarms, remote management and browser-based access. It also incorporates role-based access control and auditability, including monitoring of user activity and client IP addresses.
48. The auxiliary output at 46, above will be capable to being connected to the Malta police ANPR database			The submitted documentation further demonstrates functionality for violation




49. A facility that is enabled by a configurable option that allows a view of the road at the location of the installation to be seen at the OVDS in the LESA office			processing and adjudication, including approval/rejection workflows, audit trails, searchable records and role-based access. The platform is designed to maintain the evidence lifecycle and provide traceability of decisions and actions.
50. The configuration of the real-time video view is to be enabled only by an administrator secure access			
51. A facility to control the outstation from the OVDS at the LESA office via a secure communications method			The integration methodology also provides for secure SFTP transfer, structured directories and embedded case and enforcement metadata, including case number, date/time, measured speed, speed limit, distance, lane, direction, registration plate, sensor serial number and operator information. XML-coded exports with checksums are provided to support evidence authenticity and integrity.
52. Control messages must be encrypted to a minimum of AES 192 or equivalent			
53. The functions required at the OVDS are:			
a. View the operational status of the outstation speedmeters			
b. Enable & disable the outstation speedmeters			
c. Adjust the speed enforcement thresholds			
d. Schedule the operational/non-operational state of the speedmeters in the network of speedmeters			With regard to Item 30 – Data Storage, an evaluation clarification was requested concerning the data-transfer workflow, specifically whether all violation records, including the relevant images, metadata and evidential data, are transferred directly from the roadside speedmeter system to LESA's infrastructure, as required by the Tender Specifications, without any third-party processing, filtering, validation or storage prior to receipt by LESA.
e. Schedule changes to the speed enforcement threshold			
54. A system must be provided that:			
a. Is a viewing system that facilitates by a communications link, connectivity with all outstation speedmeters			
b. Has the OVDS application hosted on a central server at LESA and be capable of providing access to users via a web browser interface			
c. The OVDS is to have a mirrored backup facility so that loss of one server will not cause complete loss of the facility			The Tenderer clarified that the violation records and associated evidential data are transferred directly from the roadside system to LESA's infrastructure through the secure communication and data-transfer arrangements proposed. The Tenderer further clarified that no third-party processing, filtering, validation or storage takes place before the data reaches LESA.
d. Has a hierarchy of access for users that have a configurable facility to enable and disable functions depending upon the security and management level of users			
e. Management levels with associated user functional authorities			



f. Functional control of outstations for operational status, enforcement thresholds, speed limits, site descriptions is to be in the control of LESA			The Evaluation Committee considered the clarification provided and noted that the processing and adjudication activities within the VELOS PLUS platform take place only after the violation data has been received within LESA's infrastructure. The clarification therefore confirms that the violation records are transferred directly to LESA without intervention or intermediate processing or storage by a third party prior to receipt by LESA. The Tenderer clarified that the violation records and associated evidential data are transferred directly from the roadside system to LESA's infrastructure through the secure communication and data-transfer arrangements proposed. The Tenderer further clarified that no third-party processing, filtering, validation or storage takes place before the data reaches LESA. The Evaluation Committee considered the clarification provided and noted that the processing and adjudication activities within the VELOS PLUS platform take place only after the violation data has been received within LESA's infrastructure. The clarification therefore confirms that the violation records are transferred directly to LESA without intervention or intermediate processing or storage by a third party prior to receipt by LESA.
g. Has a dashboard facility to show operational status of outstations and that will show alarms to alert users to defects in the outstation or loss of communications to the outstation			
h. Has a facility to search and sort on the fields that are displayed to the user so that violation records can be found and sorted depending upon the field chosen for the search			
i. Has an export facility with handshaking capability to transfer violation record data to the LES database; the handshaking will be capable of detecting failures in the transfer of records and flagging failed transfers so that all violation data is passed to the LES database			
j. Has an audit log facility that will save data on the actions taken by users so that an administrator can trace actions as required			
k. Can export violation records only after the record is fully adjudicated by the operator in terms of:			
i. ANPR read integrity			
ii. Second check of speed is correct			
iii. Subject vehicle is correctly identified			
l. Has REJECT and ACCEPT buttons so that the correct action is applied to each violation record			
m. Has a configurable list of reasons for rejection of violation data			
n. Violation records can only be rejected after a reason for rejection is applied			
o. Has a format of the violation record that is a file that is either a .pdf or .jpg, this is to be agreed			




55. The OVDS must be capable of the storage of processed data that has been either rejected or accepted and has been transferred to the LES database			
56. Unique ref number to be applied to violation data after transfer to LES. Number supplied by LES database; this will form a transfer assurance and audit facility and is to be part of the handshake arrangement between systems			
57. A unique reference number must be applied to violation data by speedmeter at the time of creation and before transfer to the OVDS			
8.0 Maintenance, Reference Section 3, Clauses 69–75			
69. The vendor will provide a facility to carry out routine servicing and independent on site calibration of the speedmeters at intervals not exceeding 2-years			
70. The vendor must provide a service to carry out cleaning of the devices to ensure that the equipment produces acceptable image quality at all times			
71. The calibration and commissioning of the devices at each site must meet the requirements of MCCA	10	10	The Tenderer's proposed solution is considered Compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 69–75. The submitted documentation provides a comprehensive preventive and corrective maintenance programme, including routine servicing, regular cleaning, calibration, repair and replacement arrangements. The proposed calibration programme provides for independent calibration at intervals not exceeding two years , with calibration by laboratories accredited to ISO/IEC 17025:2017 or ISO/IEC 17020:2012. The programme also covers initial commissioning, post-repair recalibration and the advance calibration of spare units. The preventive maintenance plan includes annual on-site physical inspections and cleaning , together with checks of the camera, radar, infrared unit, communications, image quality,
72. The calibration of each site at first commissioning must be carried out by an independent accredited calibration laboratory, see 61 above. This will include any spare units deemed necessary by the vendor to comply with the contract terms. The spare units will be calibrated on a site in advance, as above, for use at any site in the event of equipment failure			
73. It is preferred that the instrument servicing will be carried out on site at each of the 24 locations			




74. The vendor will provide a facility to service, repair defective devices and to recalibrate where repair requires recalibration, so that the defective device is not out of service for more than 3 working days. A supply of spare speed measuring units should be made available locally to ensure the 3 days working days repair time is complied with. Exceptions to this condition will be made in discussions with the client, where the reason is deemed as "Force Majeure"			alignment and overall system condition. The submission further confirms that calibration and commissioning will be undertaken in accordance with the requirements of MCCA, with the necessary commissioning and calibration documentation provided. For corrective maintenance, the Tenderer commits to resolving faults within a maximum of three working days and maintaining a local inventory of spare parts in Malta to support the required turnaround. The lifecycle maintenance documentation also confirms the three-working-day fault rectification commitment. The submission also confirms the availability of a local helpdesk and local support arrangements through Securital Solutions Malta , supporting timely servicing and repair. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 69–75 are considered Compliant .
75. The vendor must have a local agent in Malta that can perform timely servicing and repair facilities			
9.0 Risks, Reference Section 3, Clause 84 and 85			
84. The Tenderer shall submit, as part of the Technical Offer, a comprehensive Risk Management Plan identifying all foreseeable technical and operational risks associated with the execution of the Contract.			
85. The Risk Management Plan shall, as a minimum: a. Identify risks relating to system performance, hardware and software components, integration, interoperability, data handling, maintenance, calibration, environmental exposure, and service continuity;	8	8	The Tenderer's submitted Operational Resilience & Risk Management Method Statement is considered to satisfy the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 84–85. The document provides a comprehensive risk-based approach covering the identification, assessment, mitigation, monitoring and escalation of foreseeable technical and operational risks associated with the delivery of the fixed speed enforcement service. The Risk Management Method Statement identifies risks relating to system performance ,




b. Assess the potential impact and likelihood of each identified risk; c) Clearly define mitigation measures to prevent, minimise or control such risks; d) Establish contingency procedures to ensure uninterrupted service delivery.			hardware and software, connectivity, data handling, interoperability, calibration, maintenance, environmental exposure, tampering, vandalism and service continuity. It also establishes a methodology for assessing risks based on likelihood, impact, control effectiveness and their potential effect on service continuity, evidential integrity, safety, data protection and contractual performance. The submission further provides defined mitigation and control measures, including preventive maintenance, monitoring, fault response, escalation procedures, access controls, environmental controls and corrective actions. The twelve risk cards included in Appendix A provide further risk-specific details, including the operational effect, controls/mitigation, escalation trigger, responsible owner and residual risk position. Contingency and business continuity arrangements are also addressed, covering communications disruption, utility failure, severe weather, restricted site access, infrastructure disruption and other external events. The submission establishes procedures for assessing operational impact, activating continuity or workaround measures, escalating incidents, monitoring recovery and documenting closure. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 84–85 are considered Compliant.
c. Clearly define mitigation measures to prevent, minimise or control such risks;			
d. Establish contingency procedures to ensure uninterrupted service delivery.			
Total	100	100	-




Tender ID Tenderer's Name	243652 ENGINE SPA		
	Maximum	Average Technical Score	Justification
Evaluation Criteria			
1.0 Reference Section 3, Clauses 1 – 7: Radar Technology	12	12	The Tenderer's proposed CELERITAS MVD 2022 I system, incorporating the UMRR-11 Type 44 radar sensor, satisfies the requirements stipulated under Section 3, Clauses 1–7. The submitted documentation confirms the use of non-invasive Doppler radar technology without subsurface or road-surface sensors, operation within the specified frequency band, health and safety compliance, integration of radar and camera functionality within the enforcement system, ANPR capability with enable/disable functionality through the OVDS, central management of the outstations from the LESA central environment, and installation on the side of the road without impinging upon the highway. The requirements under this section are therefore considered Compliant .
1. Uses a radar medium to sense the presence and speed of a road vehicle that does not impinge upon the structure of the road surface. There must be no sub-surface sensors			
2.The radar must be capable of being radiated without the need for a licence to transmit in the state of Malta			
3.The radar must be benign and pose no hazard to health			
4.The device must make the detection, measurement and recording of road vehicles in its immediate vicinity and be a single self-contained unit			
5. A facility for Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) that can be securely enabled and disabled as required by the operator of the system is required			
6.All outstations must be managed from a central control system that is located at the LESA office, preferably through the operator viewing system			
7.No part of the speedometer, its mounting and illumination apparatus must overhang or impinge upon the part of the highway on which vehicles are normally driven.			
2.0 Speed Detection, Reference Section 3, 8-10, 25-26		12	The Tenderer's proposed CELERITAS MVD 2022 I system




8 a. The Device must be capable of detecting a road vehicle, measuring its speed, making a permanent unalterable visual record that includes the relevant data to evidence an offence	12		satisfies the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 8–10 and 25–26. The submitted documentation demonstrates that the system is capable of detecting and measuring vehicle speeds and producing a permanent visual record of violations, together with a contemporaneous independent secondary speed measurement using a photographic method based on two images and the distance travelled between them. The system provides photographic evidence of the offending vehicle, supports detection across four lanes, including approaching and receding traffic, and allows the number of lanes, traffic direction and applicable thresholds to be configured by the operator. The submitted calibration and METAS test documentation further supports the accuracy and compliance of the speed measurement system, while the Tenderer's compliance matrix confirms full compliance with the specified requirements. The requirements under this section are therefore considered Compliant.
8 b. The Device must make a second contemporaneous and independent measurement of speed to verify the primary method			
8 c. Verification of the speed made by the secondary method, at 7b above, must be achieved by the use of a photographic method where one or 2 images are used to estimate the average speed between 2 times or 2 images. This is the preferred second method			
8 d. When a photographic second check is used there must be no visual markings applied to the road surface			
8 e. Photographic images that show the vehicle subject to the measurement			
8 f. The record is to be allocated with a unique identification number at the point of detection			
9. The distance at which the requirements at 5 ANPR, above are realised, is not defined			
10. The system must be capable of covering 4 lanes of traffic where the configuration will be required to:			
a. Detect vehicle speeds and create violation data for vehicles exceeding the speed threshold in any number of lanes up to its maximum number of lanes			
b. Detect vehicle speeds and create violation data for vehicles exceeding the speed threshold where vehicles are receding, approaching and receding & approaching the speedometer simultaneously			
c. The number of lanes and the direction of traffic will be configurable by the client operator			
3.0 Still Image Quality, Reference Section 3, Clauses 11–12	12	12	The Tenderer's proposed CELERITAS MVD 2022 system is




11. The camera must have a digital camera system that can produce a still image or images. This may be achieved by use of a still image camera or by the selection of frames or fields from a non-interlaced progressive scan video camera system			considered Compliant with the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 11 and 12. The submitted documentation demonstrates the provision of a high-resolution digital camera system capable of producing evidential and contextual still images, identifying the measured vehicle, and providing OCR/ANPR-readable registration marks. The submission also provides examples of vehicle and registration plate images in both daytime and low-light conditions, supported by an integrated 850 nm infrared illuminator. The system incorporates image adjustment and enhancement capabilities, while timestamp performance is supported by NTP/GNSS synchronisation and the submitted time-synchronisation calibration certificate. The Tenderer's compliance matrix confirms full compliance with Clauses 11 and 12. Accordingly, the requirements under this section are considered Compliant.
12 a. The image quality must be capable of: Capturing an image of the whole vehicle subject to the speed measurement			
12 b. The image quality must be capable of: Showing the surrounding area at the scene to give context to the scene at which the violation has occurred			
12 c. Identifying the vehicle subject to the measurement when one or more vehicles appear within the image			
12 d. Showing the registration mark of the vehicle in a way that can be interpreted by automatic optical character recognition (OCR) in the viewing system for the device			
12 e. Identifying the registration mark, regulated by the relevant Malta law for the display of registration marks between the minimum and maximum distances at which the system can detect speeding vehicles, this includes the OCR system			
12 f. Being temporarily enhanced by the adjustment of the image parameters, brightness, contrast and gamma, so vehicle and registration mark identity can be readily interpreted in the images exported to the final violation record			
12 g. To aid clarity in hours of darkness the camera may switch to operate in the Infra-Red spectrum to produce greyscale images			




12 h. For operations in the hours of darkness the camera must be aided by an illuminating device that operates outside of the light spectrum that is visible to the human eye. It is preferable that the illuminating device is collocated with the vehicle detector and camera			
12 i. The overall requirement for the images produced by the camera is that the make and model and registration mark of the vehicle is discernible in the images produced by the camera and to display the circumstance of the scene at which the event occurred			
12 j. The date and time for the incident shown on each violation record must be within ± 10 seconds of the local time as defined by a broadcast radio clock			
4.0 Video Capability, Reference Section 3, Clauses 13–16			
13. The speedmeter shall have the capability to make, store and recover moving video records of violation records			
14. For video records the image quality must be capable of: a. Capturing an image of the whole vehicle subject to the speed measurement			
14 b. Showing the surrounding area at the scene to give context to the scene at which the violation has occurred	12	12	
14 c. Identifying the vehicle subject to the measurement when one or more vehicles appear within the image			
14 d. Being temporarily enhanced by the adjustment of the image parameters so vehicle make, and model can be readily interpreted when compared to the images that are produced by the still image camera or cameras			
			The Tenderer's proposed CELERITAS MVD 2022 system is considered Compliant with the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 13 and 14. The submitted documentation confirms that the system is capable of recording video clips associated with violation records, including video before and after the event, and of storing and recovering such video as part of the evidential ETF file together with the relevant violation images and metadata. The system incorporates a context camera, H24 video recording capability and night-mode operation with infrared illumination. The submitted documentation further supports the integration of video with the evidential still images and associated violation information. Accordingly, the requirements under Clauses 13 and 14 are considered Compliant .




14 e. To aid clarity in hours of darkness the camera may switch to operate in the Infra-Red spectrum to produce monochrome/greyscale images			
14 f. The camera may be aided by an illuminating device that operates outside of the light spectrum that is visible to the human eye. It is preferable that the illuminating device is collocated with the vehicle detector and camera			
14 g. The overall requirement for the images produced by the camera is that the make and model of the vehicle is discernible in the images produced by the camera when they are used in conjunction with the images from the still image camera or cameras			
14 h. The date and time for the incident shown on each violation record must be within ± 10 seconds of the local time as defined by a broadcast radio clock			
5.0 Environmental Conditions, Reference Section 3, Clauses 17–21			
17. The speedmeter must be protected from dust and water ingress to IP55. IP65, IP56 and IP 66 are also acceptable			
18. The equipment shall function within specification over a temperature range that is suitable for the local environment in Malta			
19. The equipment must have a temperature sensor that will prevent the equipment from operating when the sensor detects a temperature that is beyond the working temperature range of the device	12	12	
20. The equipment must be manufactured from or be covered with a material that is resistant to UV radiation that prevents the degradation of the colour of the speedmeter housing for a minimum of 5 years			
			The Tenderer's proposed CELERITAS MVD 2022 system is considered Compliant with the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 17–21. The submitted documentation specifies IP68 protection for the relevant system components and provides supporting environmental testing in accordance with EN 60529. The equipment has been subjected to environmental temperature testing covering temperatures significantly beyond the range required for the local environment, with functional tests recorded as passed, and the submission confirms provision for preventing operation when temperatures exceed the specified limits. The submission further provides UV-resistance testing according to UL 764C and confirms corrosion protection, including compliance with salt-mist testing requirements.




21. The equipment will be required to operate in conditions that are close to the sea so must be suitably protected from corrosion in such conditions			Accordingly, the requirements under Clauses 17–21 are considered Compliant .
6.0 Safety and Security, Reference Section 3, Clauses 37, 40–41			
37. A tamper detection facility must be provided that on the occasion of unauthorised access, any violation data is erased from the camera memory			
40. All data and control messaging exchanged between the roadside unit and the central system must be encrypted using secure protocols. Encryption must meet or exceed AES-192 standards or equivalent (e.g., AES-256, ChaCha20). The system must support TLS 1.3, HTTPS, SSH, IPsec, and VPN tunneling. Encryption keys must be stored securely and rotated periodically in accordance with ISO/IEC 27001 and NIST SP 800-57 guidelines.	10	10	The Tenderer's proposed CELERITAS MVD 2022 system is considered Compliant with the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 37 and 40–41. The submitted documentation describes tamper protection and unauthorised access controls, including activation of configured security responses and protection/deletion of sensitive local data following a tamper event. The system incorporates encrypted and authenticated handling of violation data and secure communications, together with controlled cryptographic key management. The submission further provides role-based access controls, audit logging of operational activities and system events, and provision for compatibility with a central key-vault infrastructure. The supporting WELMEC software testing confirms protection of measurement data and cryptographic keys against unauthorised modification and compromise. The Tenderer's compliance matrix expressly confirms full compliance with Clauses 37, 40 and 41. Accordingly, the requirements under this section are considered Compliant .
41. All cryptographic keys used for communications and violation data must be configurable by LESA at the OVDS (Offender Violation Data System). The system must include tamper detection mechanisms that automatically revoke or delete keys upon detection of unauthorised physical or logical access. Key management must support audit logging, role-based access control, and integration with LESA's centralized key vault infrastructure.			
7.0 OVDS and Integration, Reference Section 3, (Clauses 42–57)			
42. The Offence Viewing and Decision System (OVDS) is to be capable of the export of data that is compatible with the LES (Local Enforcement System) application as defined in "LES - Speed Camera Integration API Documentation"	12	12	The Tenderer's proposed OVDS and Integration solution is considered Compliant with the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 42–57. The submitted documentation demonstrates that the proposed ECS/OVDS solution provides integration capabilities through the EIM Integration Module, including REST-based




43. The violation record and associated data must be exported to the LES driver enquiry database after adjudication by the LESA operator			Web APIs, HTTPS communication and data-file export. The system supports the processing and adjudication of violation records prior to export, automatic recognition and operator correction of vehicle registration numbers, ANPR functionality and configurable vehicle lists.
44. The speedmeter is to be capable of reading the registration plate of vehicles subject to a speeding violation and appending the registration number to a data field for that purpose			The system further provides real-time monitoring and secure remote management of roadside speedmeters, including operational status monitoring, activation and deactivation, speed enforcement threshold management and scheduling functions. The proposed OVDS provides browser-based access, authenticated users and configurable user permissions, together with centralised device monitoring, diagnostics and warning facilities.
45. The registration number produced at 44, above, will be presented in the OVDS to the verifier of each violation record and be capable of alteration by the viewer to correct any registration number that is misrepresented by the ANPR function			The documentation also demonstrates the required violation-management workflow, including verification and validation of violation records, registration-plate verification and correction, controlled export of validated records, violation acceptance and rejection/removal functions, recording of removal reasons, retention of processed records and export of violation data together with associated photographic evidence.
46. The system is to have an auxiliary output that can function as an ANPR facility that forms a configurable real-time Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system and that feature be capable of a configuration that allows the control of the enabling & disabling of the feature with connectivity possible to a separate security system			The integration solution provides unique identification of violation records and controlled exchange of violation data with external systems. The submitted documentation further confirms the required ANPR integration capability, secure communications and centralised OVDS functionality. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 42–57, are considered fully satisfied and the Tenderer's
47. The real-time ANPR function will be capable of having a list so that alarms can be raised at the administration center, this may be enabled by either a central database containing the list or the list may be uploaded from the administration center to any or all of the roadside cameras			
48. The auxiliary output at 46, above will be capable of being connected to the Malta police ANPR database			
49. A facility that is enabled by a configurable option that allows a view of the road at the location of the installation to be seen at the OVDS in the LESA office			
50. The configuration of the real-time video view is to be enabled only by an administrator secure access			




51. A facility to control the outstation from the OVDS at the LESA office via a secure communications method			submission is assessed as COMPLIANT .
52. Control messages must be encrypted to a minimum of AES 192 or equivalent			
53. The functions required at the OVDS are:			
a. View the operational status of the outstation speedmeters			
b. Enable & disable the outstation speedmeters			
c. Adjust the speed enforcement thresholds			
d. Schedule the operational/non-operational state of the speedmeters in the network of speedmeters			
e. Schedule changes to the speed enforcement threshold			
54. A system must be provided that:			
a. Is a viewing system that facilitates by a communications link, connectivity with all outstation speedmeters			
b. Has the OVDS application hosted on a central server at LESA and be capable of providing access to users via a web browser interface			
c. The OVDS is to have a mirrored backup facility so that loss of one server will not cause complete loss of the facility			
d. Has a hierarchy of access for users that have a configurable facility to enable and disable functions depending upon the security and management level of users			
e. Management levels with associated user functional authorities			
f. Functional control of outstations for operational status, enforcement thresholds, speed limits, site descriptions is to be in the control of LESA			




g. Has a dashboard facility to show operational status of outstations and that will show alarms to alert users to defects in the outstation or loss of communications to the outstation			
h. Has a facility to search and sort on the fields that are displayed to the user so that violation records can be found and sorted depending upon the field chosen for the search			
i. Has an export facility with handshaking capability to transfer violation record data to the LES database; the handshaking will be capable of detecting failures in the transfer of records and flagging failed transfers so that all violation data is passed to the LES database			
j. Has an audit log facility that will save data on the actions taken by users so that an administrator can trace actions as required			
k. Can export violation records only after the record is fully adjudicated by the operator in terms of:			
i. ANPR read integrity			
ii. Second check of speed is correct			
iii. Subject vehicle is correctly identified			
l. Has REJECT and ACCEPT buttons so that the correct action is applied to each violation record			
m. Has a configurable list of reasons for rejection of violation data			
n. Violation records can only be rejected after a reason for rejection is applied			
o. Has a format of the violation record that is a file that is either a .pdf or .jpg, this is to be agreed			
55. The OVDS must be capable of the storage of processed data that has been either rejected or accepted and has been transferred to the LES database			




56. Unique ref number to be applied to violation data after transfer to LES. Number supplied by LES database; this will form a transfer assurance and audit facility and is to be part of the handshake arrangement between systems			
57. A unique reference number must be applied to violation data by speedometer at the time of creation and before transfer to the OVDS			
8.0 Maintenance, Reference Section 3, Clauses 69–75			
69. The vendor will provide a facility to carry out routine servicing and independent on site calibration of the speedmeters at intervals not exceeding 2-years			
70. The vendor must provide a service to carry out cleaning of the devices to ensure that the equipment produces acceptable image quality at all times			
71. The calibration and commissioning of the devices at each site must meet the requirements of MCCA	10	10	The Tenderer's proposed maintenance regime is considered fully compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 69–75. The submitted documentation provides for routine preventive maintenance, cleaning, inspection, testing, servicing and independent calibration/validation of the installed speedmeters, with periodic calibration/validation intervals not exceeding two years. The proposed regime includes initial commissioning and calibration prior to operational deployment, calibration and validation records for each site, calibration of spare units prior to operational use where required, and compliance with applicable metrological and legal requirements.
72. The calibration of each site at first commissioning must be carried out by an independent accredited calibration laboratory, see 61 above. This will include any spare units deemed necessary by the vendor to comply with the contract terms. The spare units will be calibrated on a site in advance, as above, for use at any site in the event of equipment failure			
73. It is preferred that the instrument servicing will be carried out on site at each of the 24 locations			The Tenderer has also provided a comprehensive corrective maintenance and repair regime, including fault detection, remote diagnostics, local technical intervention, repair or replacement of defective components and recalibration or



74. The vendor will provide a facility to service, repair defective devices and to recalibrate where repair requires recalibration, so that the defective device is not out of service for more than 3 working days. A supply of spare speed measuring units should be made available locally to ensure the 3 days working days repair time is complied with. Exceptions to this condition will be made in discussions with the client, where the reason is deemed as "Force Majeure"			validation following repair where required. The Tenderer expressly undertakes to ensure that defective speed-measuring equipment is not out of service for more than three working days, supported by the local availability of critical spare parts and spare speed-measuring units.
			The submission further provides for on-site servicing at each of the 24 locations where technically possible, including cleaning, lens and focus verification, radar configuration checks, image and OCR testing, communication testing, cabinet and mounting inspection, replacement of modular components and post-maintenance functional testing. A local agent in Malta, supported by trained local technicians, spare equipment and manufacturer escalation arrangements, is also provided to ensure timely servicing and repair. The submitted documentation includes an ISO/IEC 17025:2017 accreditation certificate for the proposed calibration laboratory, together with detailed maintenance, calibration, corrective-repair and local-support arrangements. The Tenderer's compliance matrix expressly confirms full compliance with Clauses 69–75. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 69–75, are considered fully satisfied and the Tenderer's submission is assessed as COMPLIANT.
75. The vendor must have a local agent in Malta that can perform timely servicing and repair facilities			
9.0 Risks, Reference Section 3, Clause 84 and 85			
84. The Tenderer shall submit, as part of the Technical Offer, a comprehensive Risk Management Plan identifying all foreseeable technical and operational risks associated with the execution of the Contract.	8	8	The Tenderer's submitted Risk Management Plan is considered fully compliant with the requirements of Section 3, Clauses 84 and 85. The Plan provides a structured and comprehensive approach to the identification, assessment, mitigation, monitoring and



85. The Risk Management Plan shall, as a minimum: a. Identify risks relating to system performance, hardware and software components, integration, interoperability, data handling, maintenance, calibration, environmental exposure, and service continuity;			management of foreseeable technical and operational risks associated with the execution and continued delivery of the Contract. The identified risks cover system performance, hardware and software, OVDS operation, cybersecurity, data integrity, LESA integration and interoperability, communications, personnel and human error, maintenance and calibration, environmental exposure, utilities and telecommunications, vandalism/theft, transition and handover, and other events capable of affecting service continuity.
b. Assess the potential impact and likelihood of each identified risk; c) Clearly define mitigation measures to prevent, minimise or control such risks; d) Establish contingency procedures to ensure uninterrupted service delivery.			
c. Clearly define mitigation measures to prevent, minimise or control such risks;			The Plan establishes defined impact and likelihood levels and



d. Establish contingency procedures to ensure uninterrupted service delivery.			applies these assessments to the identified risks. Each risk is accompanied by specific mitigation measures intended to prevent, minimise or control the identified exposure. These measures include preventive maintenance and calibration, remote diagnostics, redundancy and backup systems, secure communications and access controls, cybersecurity protections, data replication and recovery mechanisms, integration testing and validation, trained and cross-trained personnel, protected roadside equipment, spare units and alternative communication arrangements. The Tenderer has also established contingency and recovery procedures intended to maintain or restore uninterrupted service delivery. These include replacement of faulty roadside units, activation of backup and mirrored systems, restoration from verified backups, manual recovery and transfer of violation data, temporary bypass and reconciliation procedures, rollback to stable integration versions, emergency recovery teams, alternative communications, replacement of damaged equipment and prioritised restoration and maintenance of critical sites. The submitted Risk Management Plan therefore addresses the requirements for comprehensive risk identification, impact and likelihood assessment, defined mitigation measures and contingency procedures for service continuity. Accordingly, the requirements under Section 3, Clauses 84–85, are considered fully satisfied and the Tenderer's submission is assessed as <i>COMPLIANT</i>.
Total	100	100	-



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CONFIDENTIAL AND URGENT

6 October 2026

**Department of Contracts
Notre Dame Ravelin
Floriana FRN1601**

Attn: Adrian Dalli, Director General (Contracts)

**Local Enforcement Systems Agency
LESA Office, 246,
Mater Boni Consilii Street,
Fgura FGR1611**

Attn: Charlton Falzon Cascun, CEO

**By email only (charlton.falzon-cascun.1@gov.mt, sarah.bondin@lesa.gov.mt,
adrian.dalli@gov.mt; info.contracts@gov.mt)**

Dear Sirs,

**Re: REF. NO. CT2047/2026 - CALL FOR TENDERS FOR THE LEASING OF FIXED RADAR
SPEED METERS AND DATA PROCESSING APPLICATIONS AT VARIOUS SITES IN
MALTA FOR THE LOCAL ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS AGENCY (the "Call for Tenders")**

1. We have been instructed to write to you by Securital Solutions Limited ("**Securital**") regarding the above-captioned Call for Tenders. Securital acknowledges receipt of the letter of rejection sent to it on 29th September 2026 by the Department of Contracts and the Local Enforcement Systems Agency (the "**Contracting Authority**") whereby Securital was informed that its 2 respective tenders bearing TID No. 243655 and 243654 were not the most economically advantageous.
2. According to the letter of rejection, the tender was recommended for award to Engine SpA (TID 243652) (the "**Recommended Tenderer**").

3. Securital was also informed of its right to appeal by Friday 9th October. Securital needs access to information regarding the procurement process, the Recommended Tenderer (and its bid) and Securital's bid to be in a position to exercise its right to an effective review.
4. The right to effective review depends on the disclosure of sufficient information to enable Securital to determine whether the Contracting Authority's decision is vitiated by errors or unlawfulness.
5. The Contracting Authority is under an obligation at law to disclose this information. According to EU jurisprudence, information may be withheld only if its disclosure would impede law enforcement, is contrary to public interest, would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of the Recommended Tenderer or might prejudice fair competition.
6. The information requested by Securital does not fit under any one of the four exceptions admitted by EU law and jurisprudence. Therefore, the information requested must be disclosed by the Contracting Authority.
7. Where the Contracting Authority refuses to disclose any information requested on the basis of confidentiality, it is still obliged to communicate the information requested in a neutral form. We trust that the Contracting Authority will do that if such circumstances exist.
8. Further, you are put on notice that the law applicable to the disclosure of information within the context of public procurement processes is the Public Procurement Regulations (S.L. 601.03) and the EU Classical Directive and the Remedies Directive from which the national regulations were derived. This is the special law which overrides the application of the Freedom of Information Act (Chapter 496 of the Laws of Malta) (the "**FOI Act**"). Therefore, you cannot rely on the exemptions in the FOI Act which only applies to: (i) requests for information submitted under the FOI Act and (ii) judicial proceedings governed by the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure.
9. Securital has created a schedule to facilitate the exchange of this information. The Schedule, which is marked as "**Annex A**", is attached to this information request. The Contracting Authority is requested to fill in the column entitled 'Contracting Authority's Response' to streamline communication and to send it back via e-mail as soon as possible.
10. Because the appeal period lapses on 9th October, this information is to be disclosed by **Wednesday 7th October at 1730 hrs.**



11. This will ensure compliance with Securital's legal right to a rapid and effective remedy. If the Contracting Authority refuses to provide the requested information, Securital reserves the right of raising this issue as a specific ground of appeal in any appeal before the Public Contracts Review Board

All our client's rights are reserved.

Please be guided accordingly.

Sincerely Yours,
Ganado Advocates


Adv. Clement Mifsud-Bonnici
(cmifsudb@ganado.com)


Adv. Calvin Calleja
(ccalleja@ganado.com)

ANNEX A

#	REQUESTED INFORMATION	REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE	CONTRACTING AUTHORITY'S RESPONSE
Recommended Tenderer			
1.	The list of principal services of a similar nature including major projects involving the supply, installation, operation or maintenance of monitoring, traffic enforcement or security systems (e.g. CCTV systems, speed enforcement systems, ANPR systems or other comparable public safety monitoring technologies) which have been implemented by the Recommended Tenderer.	Experience and reference material relied on to demonstrate experience and capacities are not confidential. Regulation 40(2)(c) of the Public Procurement Regulations (S.L. 601.03) (the "PPR") expressly says that "the documentation submitted by economic operators attesting that they comply with selection criteria" is not considered confidential. Malta's Court of Appeal in a judgment delivered on 16 July 2024 in the names <i>Saviour Galea et vs Kunsill Lokali Hal Lija et</i> [Ref. 209/2024/1] revoked a decision by the Public Contracts Review Board (the "PCRB") for wrongly rejecting the appellant's request for disclosure of documentation under Regulation 40(2)(c) of the PPR. See also C-54/21 <i>Antea Polska</i> (17 November 2022) which stated, at para. 73, that "<i>the tenderers' relevant experience and the reference material which they attach to their tenders, by way of demonstration of that experience and their capacities, it must be held that such information [...] cannot be classified as confidential in its entirety</i>".	
2.	Copies of the documents, including the completed List of Projects, submitted by the Recommended Tenderer as evidence of the successful implementation of 3 or more relevant	Experience and reference material relied on to demonstrate experience and capacities are not confidential. Regulation 40(2)(c) of the PPR expressly says that "the documentation submitted by economic	

#	REQUESTED INFORMATION	REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE	CONTRACTING AUTHORITY'S RESPONSE
	projects completed between 2021 and 2025, demonstrating comparable scale and complexity. If the Contracting Authority is of the opinion that the identities of the end-clients for whom the projects were delivered may be confidential, the Contracting Authority is to disclose this information in a "neutral" non-name-specific format <i>inter alia</i> by redacting the identity of the end-client and retaining the details of the project.	operators attesting that they comply with selection criteria" is not considered confidential. Malta's Court of Appeal in a judgment delivered on 16 July 2024 in the names <i>Saviour Galea et vs Kunsill Lokali Hal Lija et</i> [Ref. 209/2024/1] revoked a decision by the PCRB for wrongly rejecting the appellant's request for disclosure of documentation under Regulation 40(2)(c) of the PPR.	
3.	A copy of the Recommended Tenderer's European Single Procurement Document (ESPD), even if it is integrated within the Tender Preparation Tool.	The self-declarations made by a bidder in the ESPD are not confidential. Regulation 40(2)(c) of the PPR expressly says that "the documentation submitted by economic operators attesting that they comply with selection criteria" is not considered confidential. Malta's Court of Appeal in a judgment delivered on 16 July 2024 in the names <i>Saviour Galea et vs Kunsill Lokali Hal Lija et</i> [Ref. 209/2024/1] revoked a decision by the PCRB for wrongly rejecting the appellant's request for disclosure of documentation under Regulation 40(2)(c) of the PPR.	
4.	The identity of the sub-contractors nominated by the Recommended Tenderer in its bid, if any. This includes the disclosure of the ESPD submitted by those sub-contractors (if	Regulation 40(2)(b) of the PPR expressly says that the "names of subcontractors" are not confidential. In any case, essential information on sub-contractors must be accessible to all tenderers to ensure the right to an effective remedy.	

#	REQUESTED INFORMATION	REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE	CONTRACTING AUTHORITY'S RESPONSE
	any), and details of the percentage of works to be sub-contracted (if any).		
5.	The identity of Key Experts nominated by the Recommended Tenderer in its bid, including their curriculum vitae. If the Contracting Authority is of the opinion that the identity of the Key Experts may be confidential, the Contracting Authority is to disclose their curriculum vitae in a non-name-specific format by redacting any information which identifies them.	Regulation 40(2)(b) of the PPR expressly says that the "names of subcontractors" are not confidential. In any case, essential information on key experts must be accessible to all tenderers to ensure the right to an effective remedy.	
6.	A copy of the documentation, including technical literature, submitted by the Recommended Tenderer to corroborate the compliance of its offer.	Regulation 40(2)(d) of the PPR expressly says that "technical information which is already made available in public" is not confidential. In any case, essential information on compliance with the technical offer must be accessible to all tenderers to ensure the right to an effective remedy.	
Procurement and Evaluation Procedure			
7.	The identity of the members comprising the Tender Evaluation Committee (TEC) and their academic and professional qualifications.	This information is not confidential and will become known during the PCRБ sitting. In any case, it is a matter of transparency and good administrative behaviour to disclose this information.	
8.	The identity of the technical advisors to the TEC and their academic and professional qualifications.	This information is not confidential and will become known during the PCRБ sitting.	

#	REQUESTED INFORMATION	REASONS FOR DISCLOSURE	CONTRACTING AUTHORITY'S RESPONSE
		In any case, it is a matter of transparency and good administrative behaviour to disclose this information.	
9.	An IT audit report identifying the audit logs in relation to this procurement procedure.	This information is not confidential and will become known during the PCR B sitting. In any case, it is a matter of transparency and good administrative behaviour to disclose this information.	
Abnormally Low Clarification			
10.	Any request for explanations sent by the TEC to the Recommended Tenderer in terms of Regulation 243 of the PPR regarding the apparently abnormally low financial offer. If no such explanations were requested, the Contracting Authority is requested to confirm this.	This information is not confidential and will become known during the PCR B sitting. In any case, it is a matter of transparency and good administrative behaviour to disclose this information.	
11.	The explanations, and any supporting evidence, submitted by the Recommended Tenderer in reply to any request made by the TEC under Regulation 243 of the PPR to explain the price or costs proposed in its financial offer. If the Contracting Authority is of the opinion that aspects of this information may be confidential, the Contracting Authority must state the reasons for its	The essential content of the clarifications submitted by the Recommended Tenderer, if any, must be accessible to Securital in view of the principle of transparency and the right to an effective remedy.	

	decision to treat such information as confidential and must, in any event, communicate its essential content in a neutral summary form. ¹		
12.	The assessment carried out by the TEC, on any replies submitted by the Recommended Tenderer in response to any requests for explanations in terms of Regulation 243 of the PPR, to determine that the financial offer tendered by the Recommended Tenderer is not abnormally low.	This information is not confidential and will become known during the PCRБ sitting. In any case, it is a matter of transparency and good administrative behaviour to disclose this information.	

¹ Case C-54/21, Antea Polska S.A. et vs Państwowe Gospodarstwo Wodne Wody Polskie (Judgment delivered by the Fourth Chamber of the Court on 17 November 2022) paras. 65–67.